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Abstract:   
We consider situations where legal liability yields insufficient incentives for socially 
efficient behavior, e.g., individuals who cause harm are not always sued or are unable to 
pay fully for harm done. Some individuals nevertheless behave efficiently because of 
intrinsic prosocial concerns. Others have no such concerns but would like people to 
believe that they do. We show that fault-based liability is generally more effective than 
strict liability in harnessing social image concerns. This extends to the case where courts 
can make mistakes. The rules of proof then affect the inferences drawn from court 
decisions and therefore the stigma attached to an adverse judgment. If fault is a rare 
event, plaintiffs or prosecutors should bear the burden of proving the defendant’s fault; 
otherwise there are cases where defendants should prove compliance with the legal 
standard of behavior. Under either assignment of the burden of proof, incentives to 
comply are maximized by a standard of proof stronger than a mere preponderance of 
evidence. 
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1 Introduction
In his Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith remarks that an individual
found to have caused harm faces not only the possibility of a legal sanction
 e.g., the damages he must pay  but also social disapproval or stigma.
We inquire how a concern for social approval interacts with the incentives
created by law and how this a¤ects the relative performance of strict versus
fault-based liability regimes. The distinction between negligence and strict
liability is pervasive in private litigation, e.g., tort or contract law, but also
arises in the public enforcement of laws and regulations.
To x ideas, consider a situation where tort law yields insu¢ cient in-
centives to control the risk of harming third parties. Injurers are partially
judgment-proof or are not always sued, e.g., it is not always feasible to prove
harm or identify the injurer. Some individuals nevertheless exert socially ef-
cient care. They do so out of intrinsic moral or prosocial concerns. Other
individuals have no such concerns but would like people to believe that they
do; that is, they care about social approval. For instance, in a recent ex-
perimental study on liability rules (Angelova et al. 2012), half the subjects
invested in safety measures even in the No Liability treatment and even
though they could not be identied by the other subjects as having caused
harm. Regarding the reputational motive, many experimental or eld stud-
ies have also shown that social image concerns are important motivators
of prosocial behavior (Dana et al. 2006, Ellingsen and Johannesson 2008,
Andreoni and Bernheim 2008, Ariely et al. 2010, Funk 2010, Lacetera and
Macis 2010, among others).
In our framework, an individuals actions are not directly observable by
society at large. However, adverse court judgments provide public informa-
tion from which inferences can be drawn about the individualsactions and
therefore about their intrinsic predispositions. Under either strict liability
or the negligence rule, social image concerns are shown to provide the non
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prosocial individuals with some incentives to mimic the virtuous. The is-
sue is how this inuences the optimal design of liability regimes, when the
objective is to induce socially e¢ cient behavior.
A basic result is that fault-based liability is more e¤ective than strict lia-
bility in harnessing reputational concerns. The reason is that trial outcomes
are then more informative. Under strict liability, an adverse ruling merely
ascertains that the defendant caused harm, not that he took inadequate
precautions. Under the negligence rule, a liability ruling also ascertains
that the defendant exerted inadequate care, thereby providing more precise
information about his character. Socially useful incentives are therefore de-
rived from the signaling role of fault. Although the preceding argument
is made with respect to the nding of negligence in a tort context, the same
reasoning applies more generally.
To further explore the signalling role of fault, we extend the analysis to
imperfect evidence about a defendants actions. A complete characteriza-
tion of a fault-based regime must now consider how courts deal with the risk
of judicial error. The legal tools for this purpose are the assignment of the
burden of proof  whether it is for the plainti¤ to prove the defendants
fault or for the defendant to prove compliance with the legal standard of be-
havior  and the standard of proof that needs to be satised by the party
with the burden of proof. The burden of proof assignment and the stan-
dard of proof a¤ect the inferences drawn from trial outcomes; that is, they
bear on the meaningor signicanceof a nding of fault. We show that
when injurers have social image concerns, and by contrast with the results
in Demougin and Fluet (2006, 2008), compliance with the legal due care
standard is maximized by a standard of proof stronger than the common
law preponderance of evidence. Roughly speaking, the assignment of the
burden of proof depends on whether inadequate behavior is a frequent or
infrequent event. When it seldom occurs, incentives to comply are maxi-
mized by assigning to the plainti¤ (or prosecutor) the burden of proving the
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defendants non-compliance.
A recent microeconomic literature has emphasized that ones actions may
signal something about unobservable predispositions and that some predis-
positions are socially valued; see in particular Bernheim (1994), Bénabou
and Tirole (2006, 2011), and Daughety and Reinganum (2010). De¤ains
and Fluet (2013) incorporate this approach in the unilateral accident model.
The focus of that paper is the extent to which formal legal sanctions crowd-
out or crowd-in informal motivations under di¤erent liability rules.1 In the
present paper, we also compare liability regimes but the emphasis is on the
information content of judicial decisions and on prescriptions about the law
of evidence under evidentiary uncertainty.
Our analysis is related to the legal literature on the interaction between
laws and norms and on the role of signalling motives and imitative behavior;
see in particular Kahan (1998) and Posner (1998, 2000). For a general discus-
sion of legal sanctions versus informal motivation as regulators of conduct,
see McAdams and Rasmusen (2007) and Shavell (2002). Our description of
fault-based regimes also bears a relation to the concept of expressive law.
According to this view even mild law, i.e., law backed by small sanctions
or poorly enforced, can have desirable e¤ects on behavior; see for instance
Cooter (1998) and the discussion in Tyran and Feld (2006). Finally, our
results are also related to the Law and Economics literature on the e¤ect of
stigma and shaming penalties in relation to criminal activity; see Rasmusen
(1996), Harel and Clement (2007), and Zasu (2007) among others.
Section 2 presents the basic setup. Section 3 compares the incentives
under strict liability and fault-based regimes with no judicial error. The next
two sections introduce imperfect evidence about the defendants behavior
and derive the implications concerning the design of compliance maximizing
legal regimes. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
1How material penalties and rewards a¤ect informal motivations has been explored in
a vast experimental and empirical literature. See Frey and Jegen (2001) for a survey.
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2 The model
We start with a simple version of the economic model of liability for acci-
dents (i.e., tort law). Private victims may sue individuals who have caused
harm in order to obtain compensation. Later we show that, with minor
modications, the same model can be reinterpreted in terms of the public
enforcement of laws and regulations.2 Governmental agents then detect and
prosecute violations which are sanctioned by nes.
Legal liability. Risk-neutral individuals are engaged in an activity
which may impose an accidental loss of amount L on third parties. The
risk of causing harm depends on the level of care which is e = 0 for low (or
no) care and e = 1 for high care respectively. The probability of accident is
p(0) = pl and p(1) = ph where pl > ph. The opportunity cost of low care is
normalized to zero, that of high care is c distributed according to the di¤er-
entiable cumulative function G(c) with support [0; c]. The interpretation is
that the opportunity cost of care depends on the circumstances one may be
facing.
Social welfare is maximized if, depending on the circumstances, individ-
uals choose the level of care minimizing the sum of precaution costs and
of expected harm. When the cost of care is c, the socially e¢ cient action
minimizes ce+ p(e)L. It is therefore
e(c) =

1 if c  c  (pl   ph)L;
0 otherwise,
(1)
where c is the critical cost level below which high care should be exerted.
We consider situations where legal liability does not always ensure so-
cially e¢ cient behavior. First, individuals causing harm are sued only with
some probability q, e.g., they cannot always be identied or the victim has
no proof. Secondly, injurers may not be able to pay fully for the harm they
2See Polinsky and Shavell (2007) for a survey of the economic model of the public
enforcement of law.
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caused. If found liable, the legal damages they will actually pay is min(w;L)
where w denotes the defendants defendants liability limit, e.g., his assets.3
When injurers are partially judgment-proof, strict liability is well known
to provide insu¢ cient incentives. By contrast, the negligence rule may then
induce e¢ cient behavior. The following assumption rules out this possibility.
Assumption 1: plqmin(w;L) < min(c; c):
Any combination of q and w satisfying the assumption is su¢ cient for our
purpose. In Figure 1, the intervals denoted strict liability, negligence,
and either ruleindicate the range of c values for which the liability rules
induce socially e¢ cient precautions.
Consider rst the strict liability rule. Injurers must then in principle pay
for the harm they cause irrespective of circumstances. However, because he
is not always sued or because of the limited liability constraint, an individual
with cost of care c exerts high care only if c  q(pl ph)min(w;L). Assump-
tion 1 therefore implies that there will be circumstances where individuals
take inadequate precautions.
),min()( Lwppq hl -
strict liability
negligence rule
),min( Lwqpl Lpp hl )( -
c
0 c
either rule
Figure 1. Ine¢ ciencies
Under the negligence rule, courts are assumed to be able to verify the
circumstance c and to set the legal due care standard at the socially e¢ -
3A similar set-up is employed in Shavell (1984) to analyze the joint use of liability and
regulation. Note that the cost of care does not a¤ect the individualsliability limit. Either
the cost is non pecuniary or the liability limit satises w  w0   c, where w0 is initial
wealth and c is the upper bound on precaution costs.
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cient level. Accordingly, an individual faces a risk of liability only when he
exerts low care and c  c. Because of the dilution of incentives due to the
chance of not being sued or to his partial judgment-proofness, an individual
complies with due care only if c  plqmin(w;L). Again there will be cir-
cumstances where precautions are inadequate, although ine¢ cient care will
be less frequent than under strict liability (unless ph is zero).
When c  c or equivalently G(c) = 1, high care is socially e¢ cient in
all circumstances. If in addition ph = 0, there is then no di¤erence between
strict liability and a fault-based regime. We rule out this possibility.
Assumption 2: G(c) < 1 or ph > 0:
Social image concerns. So far we have described the standard frame-
work where behavior depends only on private costs and benets as conven-
tionally dened. We now consider informal motivations. We assume that
there are two types of potential injurers. Some potential injurers are good
citizenswith prosocial predispositions. They seek to behave in a socially
or morally responsible manner by comparing their opportunity cost of care
with the expected harm they impose on others.4 Such individuals, referred
to as type  = 1, choose the socially e¢ cient level of care irrespective of legal
legal sanctions. They exert high care when c  c and low care otherwise.
There is a known proportion  of such individuals.
Secondly, individuals who are thought to be intrinsically prosocial earn
social esteem, a source of utility. For those individuals who are not proso-
cial, referred to as type  = 0, behavior is determined by the utility function
u = wn + I where wn is net nal wealth,  is a positive parameter and
I  E( j I) is the belief of society at large about the individuals type con-
ditional on the information I. Given our denition of types, I is simply the
posterior probability that the individual is intrinsically prosocial and I is
4This is a simple version of Kants Categorical Imperative, as in Brekke et al. (2003).
See Section 3 for a formulation where prosocial individuals su¤er guilt when they deviate
from the socially appropriate behavior.
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the utility derived by the individual from societys beliefs about his intrinsic
predispositions. In our analysis, much will depend on what information is
available in society at large.
An individuals type is private information. For society at large, so
are the circumstances faced by the individual, his chosen level of care and
whether he caused harm, except insofar as these can be inferred from legal
proceedings against the individual or from court judgments. Specically, we
assume that the only information publiclyavailable about an individual
 that is, in society at large  is either B for bad news, which refers to
the case where the individual is known to have been liable for harm done
under the prevailing liability rule, or G for no news, i.e. , the individual is
not known to have been liable. As will become clear, no news is good news
in the sense that ones social image is then more favorable than following
bad news.
Adverse reputational e¤ects imply that injurers would favor condential
settlements (and would be willing to pay hush money, see Daughety and
Reinganum 1999). For simplicity we consider a simple litigation subgame
where condentiality is not feasible. Following the occurrence of harm, with
probability q victims have access to all the evidence required under the
prevailing liability rule; this is common knowledge between the parties. Ini-
tiating procedures involves a small cost, but litigation costs are otherwise
negligible. Under a strict liability rule, the victim knows that he will succeed
in court, hence a suit is led. Under the negligence rule, a suit is led only
if the evidence shows that the injurer would be found negligent. We assume
the following: rst, lawsuits are public information (as would be the out-
come at trial); second, if the case does not go to trial and payment has been
extracted by the plainti¤, it becomes publicly known that such an agree-
ment has been reached. Under these assumptions, out-of-court settlements
have the same reputational e¤ects as trials and the parties are indi¤erent
between settling or going to trial.
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The meaning of good and bad news depends on the liability regime.
The prevailing liability rule is common knowledge and society makes the
correct inferences from judicial procedures and trial outcomes. Under strict
liability, bad news B about an individual means that he caused harm, was
subsequently sued (which arises only with probability q) and was or would
have been held liable in court. Under the negligence rule, bad news means
that the individual caused harm, was sued and was or would have been held
liable, hence was at fault.
Public enforcement of law. It will sometimes be useful to reinterpret
our ndings in a public enforcement of law framework. Plainti¤s are replaced
by public agents in charge of enforcing the law, e.g., the police, inspectors
or prosecutors. We give two examples.
Consider rst a regulation against environmental spills. A spill creates
harm of amount L and occurs with probability ph or pl depending on precau-
tions. The ne for a spill is s. To allow for imperfect enforcement, Assump-
tion 1 is rewritten as plqmin(w; s) < min(c; c) where q is the probability
of detecting and prosecuting the individual responsible. Suppose c  c,
i.e., the high precaution level should always be chosen. Under a strict lia-
bility regulation, all spills are in principle sanctioned. Under a fault-based
regime, the regulation is that high precautions should be taken. Spills are
sanctioned only when the regulation has not been complied with; otherwise
they are considered as an unavoidable risk.
Consider next a situation where ph = 0 and pl = 1, i.e., e = 0 can be
interpreted as committing an action that causes harm (or expected harm,
e.g. speeding on highways) versus not committing the action. Suppose c >
c so that the action is socially warranted in some circumstances. A strict
liability regime denes the action as unlawful irrespective of circumstances;
q is the probability of detecting violations of the law. Under a fault-based
regime, the action is unlawful only in the circumstances c  c.5
5Strict liability disregards circumstances. Prosocial individuals then sometimes e¢ -
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3 Strict versus Fault-Based Liability
By assumption prosocial individuals always take adequate precautions, so we
only need to examine the behavior of the non prosocial. Let (e; c) denote
the probability that an individual is found liable given that he caused harm
and is sued. The probability is determined by the liability rule and may
depend on the defendants level of care and the circumstances. Under strict
liability, (e; c) = 1 irrespective of care and of circumstances. Under the
negligence rule, (e; c) = 1 if e = 0 and c  c and is otherwise zero.
Incentives. Given the cost of care c, the expected utility of a non
prosocial as a function of his care level is
u = p(e)q(e; c)[w0  min(w;L) + B)]
+ (1  p(e)q(e; c))[w0 + G]  ce; e 2 f0; 1g; (2)
where B and G are societys beliefs about the individuals type conditional
on bad and good news respectively. These beliefs are determined at equilib-
rium but are taken as given by the individual. High care is exerted if and
only if
c  q [p(0)(0; c)  p(1)(1; c)] [min(w;L) + ]; (3)
where   G B will be referred to as the reputational penalty associated
with bad news.
Under the strict liability rule, the condition (3) reduces to
c  q(pl   ph)[min(w;L) + ]  cS(): (4)
The right-hand side is the cost threshold below which a non prosocial exerts
high care under strict liability (hence the subscript S). The critical cost level
is written as a function of the reputational penalty yet to be determined.
ciently choose not to comply with the law given their knowledge of circumstances. See
Shavell (2012).
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Under the negligence rule, (1; c) = 0 for all values of c, (0; c) = 1 if
c  c and is zero otherwise. Therefore the condition (3) cannot be satised
when c > c, i.e., the individual then necessarily exerts low care. He exerts
high care if and only if
c  minfqpl[min(w;L) + ]; cg  cN (); (5)
where the right-hand side is the cost threshold below which a non prosocial
exerts high care under the negligence rule (hence the subscript N). Note
that the threshold cannot be above the e¢ cient c.
The proportion of the non prosocial exerting high care is G(cr) where r
denotes the liability regime. It will be useful to focus instead on the ratio,
denoted y, of the population of non prosocial exerting high care over those
who should be exerting high care. This ratio will be referred to as the
compliance rate and is dened by y  G(cr)=G(c). As a function of the
reputational penalty, the compliance rate satises
y =  r() 
G(cr())
G(c)
; r = S;N: (6)
When the reputational penalty is nil, the compliance rate is the same
as in the standard model without social preferences. Assumption 1 then
ensures  S(0) <  N (0) < 1. Under either liability rule, the compliance
rate is increasing in the reputational penalty. Under strict liability, for a
su¢ ciently large penalty, overcompliance (i.e., y > 1) is consistent with (4)
and (6), although this will never arise at equilibrium as shown below. Under
the negligence rule, the compliance rate is also increasing in the reputational
penalty, but only up to the socially e¢ cient level y = 1.
Information and beliefs. We now turn to the determination of the
reputational penalty. Using Bayesrule, the posterior beliefs  and there-
fore the reputational penalty  can be expressed as a function of the com-
pliance rate. The function di¤ers between liability regimes.
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Lemma 1 Let p  G(c)ph + (1   G(c))pl. Given the compliance rate
y, the reputational penalty satises  = 'r(y)  rG(y)   rB(y), r = S;N .
Under strict liability,

S
B(y) =
p
p + (1  )(1  y)G(c)(pl   ph) ;

S
G(y) =
(1  qp)
1  q[p + (1  )(1  y)G(c)(pl   ph)] :
Under the negligence rule, 
N
B (y) = 0 for all y and

N
G (y) =

1  (1  )(1  y)G(c)plq :
Both 'S(y) and 'N (y) are strictly decreasing functions, with 'S(1) = 0 and
'N (1) = .
Note that p is the average probability of accident (over all potential
circumstances) under the socially appropriate level of care; Assumption 2
implies p > 0. Under the negligence rule, bad news reveals perfectly that
the injurer is non prosocial, hence 
N
B (y) = 0. Under strict liability, this only
becomes more likely so. When all the non prosocial exert e¢ cient care, bad
and good news provide no information at all under strict liability. Everyone
then behaves the same and therefore faces the same probability of an adverse
judgment. As a result, posterior beliefs do not di¤er from the prior, i.e.,

S
B(1) = 
S
G(1) = . By contrast, when all individuals comply with due care
under the negligence rule, good news is uninformative because it occurs with
certainty, but bad news would remain perfectly revealing.6 A reputational
penalty that is strictly decreasing in the compliance rate implies strategic
substitutability: when more individuals exert e¢ cient care, the incentive to
avoid bad news becomes smaller.
6Bad news is then an out-of-equilibrium event with zero probablity, hence 
N
B (1) cannot
be computed using Bayesrule. The reputational penalty is then obtained from 'N (1) 
limy!1 'N (y) = . The belief 
N
B (1) = 0 can also be rationalized in terms of Cho and
Kreps(1987) D1 criterion.
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The good news-bad news events constitute a binary signal about the
individualstype. An important consideration for what follows is whether
the binary signal under the negligence regime is more informative than the
signal under strict liability. Obviously, learning whether an individual has
or has not caused harm is less informative than also learning whether he
was at fault following the occurrence of harm. However, the good and bad
news events considered here do not contain such detailed information. From
Lemma 1 (and given Assumption 2), bad news represents more unfavor-
able information under the negligence rule than under strict liability, i.e.,

N
B (y) < 
S
B(y) for all y. By contrast, good news (i.e., no news in the
present context) need not constitute more favorable information. Loosely
speaking, the intuition is that under negligence no newsmay provide little
information if there is little scope for nding fault (i.e., G(c) is small), while
under strict liability no newsmay provide substantial information when
pl is large compared to ph.
Lemma 2 The good news-bad news signal under the negligence rule is more
informative than under strict liability, implying 
N
G (y)  SG(y) for all y, if
and only if
qpl  ph
G(c)ph + (1 G(c))pl : (7)
Condition (7) is satised when G(c) = 1, i.e., when high care is socially
warranted in all potential circumstances. By continuity, it is also satised
when G(c) is not too small and qpl < 1. Condition (7) ensures that

N
B (y) < 
S
B(y) < 
S
G(y)  NG (y); for all y. (8)
When (7) is not satised, the weak inequality on the right-hand side of (8)
does not hold for some values of the compliance rate. The binary signals un-
der the negligence rule and strict liability are then non comparable in terms
of the usual more informative thanranking. Observe that (8) is su¢ cient,
albeit not necessary, for the reputational penalties to satisfy 'N (y) > 'S(y)
12
for all y. Later in this section we provide an example where the preceding
inequality does not hold at equilibrium.
Equilibrium. An equilibrium is a compliance rate and a reputational
penalty that simultaneously solve y =  r() and  = 'r(y). Denote an
equilibrium by Er = (yr;r). Figure 2 provides an example for both the
strict liability and negligence rules. Figure 3 provides yet another example
with a larger , i.e., non prosocial individuals care more about social ap-
proval. The gure illustrates the case where  is large enough for everyone
to comply with due care under the negligence rule.
y
D
1
1
0
l
SE
NE
)(D= Sy y
)(yNj=D
)(ySj=D
)(D= Ny y
Figure 2. Equilibria
Proposition 1 Under either regime there is a unique equilibrium (yr;r)
with r > 0, where r = S refers to strict liability and r = N to the fault-
based (or negligence) regime. In all cases, yS < 1:
(i) When the condition (7) holds, yS < yN .
(ii) When the condition does not hold, there are cases where yS > yN and
S > N .
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(iii) yS < yN and S < N when  or  are large. When  is su¢ ciently
large, yN = 1 and N = .
The negligence rule does better than strict liability when it provides a
more informative signal or when there is a large proportion of prosocial indi-
viduals or esteem concerns are important. In particular, the negligence rule
induces the rst-best rate of compliance when esteem concerns are strong
enough. By contrast, strict liability always induces undercompliance.
y
D
1
1
0
l
SE
NE
)(yNj=D
)(D= Sy y
)(ySj=D
)(D= Ny y
Figure 3. First best under the negligence rule
Corollary 1 Under either regime, the compliance rate is increasing in w,
q or ; the reputational penalty is decreasing in w and . Under the fault-
based regime, the reputational penalty and compliance rate are increasing in
; under strict liability, they are increasing (decreasing) in  when  is small
(large).
Relaxing the sources of ine¢ ciency, i.e., increasing the probability of suit
or reducing the extent of judgment-proofness, increases compliance despite
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the possibility of some motivational crowding-out because of a smaller
reputational penalty. Similarly, a greater concern for social image improves
compliance. The second part of the corollary considers how the externality
due to esteem concerns varies with the number of prosocial individuals. In a
fault-based regime, a greater proportion of virtuous individuals shifts the 'N
curve upwards and therefore induces a greater number of the non prosocial
to exert e¢ cient care. Under strict liability, the e¤ect is ambiguous: if the
proportion of virtuous individuals is su¢ ciently small, more of them shifts
the 'S curve upwards, thereby increasing the frequency of socially e¢ cient
behavior; the opposite obtains when the proportion of virtuous individuals
is su¢ ciently large.
y
D
1
1
0
l
SE
NE
)(yNj=D
)(D= Sy y
)(ySj=D
)(D= Ny y
Figure 4. Relaxing Assumption 1
We briey describe the equilibria when Assumption 1 is relaxed. Sup-
pose that individuals causing harm are always sued and have su¢ cient assets
to fully compensate for the harm done. In the standard model without so-
cial image concerns, the rst best then obtains under either strict liability
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or the negligence rule; thus  N (0) =  N (0) = 1. The equilibria with so-
cial image concerns are represented in Figure 4. Under strict liability, the
equilibrium is (yS ;S) = (1; 0); an adverse court judgment imposes no rep-
utational penalty and the non prosocial are motivated solely by formal legal
incentives. Under the negligence rule, the equilibrium is (yN ;N ) = (1; ).
Although having been found negligent would impose a reputational penalty,
the incentives provided by reputational concerns are superuous with re-
spect to inducing compliance with due care.
A case where strict liability does better. Let ph = 0, pl = 1 and
G(c) < 1 as in the public enforcement of law example discussed in Section 2.
Specically, individuals must decide between committing or not committing
a harmful action such as speeding. The condition (7) then does not hold.
Lemma 1 nevertheless implies that 'N (y) > 'S(y) in a neighborhood of full
compliance. However, whether the inequality holds everywhere now depends
on the parameters. Let q > 1=2 and G(c) > (1   q)=q. It can be shown
that 'N (y) < 'S(y) in a neighborhood of y = 0 if
 <
1
2

1  1  q
G(c)q

:
The curves then cross at
y0 =
1
2(1  )

1  2  1  q
G(c)q

:
When ph = 0, the compliance rate function is the same for both liability
regimes in the relevant range, so we draw a single function  in Figure 6.
The situation represented is one where formal legal incentives have little bite
because min(w; s) is small, i.e., the ne is small (mild law) or individuals
have little wealth anyway. As shown in the gure, the equilibrium com-
pliance rate and reputational penalty are larger under strict liability than
under the fault-based regime. Nevertheless, with stronger concerns for social
image yielding a compliance function such as b in the gure, the fault-based
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regime provides greater incentives than strict liability. With even stronger
social image concerns, full compliance would be achieved under the fault
regime.
y
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)(D=yy
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)(ˆD=yy
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Figure 5. A case with ph = 0, pl = 1.
In the situation represented in Figure 6, not having been prosecuted is
more favorable information under strict liability than under a fault-based
regime. This is true at any compliance rate but the discrepancy gets larger
at small compliance rates, then yielding a larger reputational penalty under
strict liability. When liability regimes can only implement mediocre com-
pliance rates, strict liability does better because of the larger reputational
penalty. At higher compliance rates, the reputational penalty becomes small
under strict liability but is bounded below by the prior  under the fault-
based regime. When higher compliance rates are attainable, the fault-based
regime then does better. The intuition is that, under strict liability, escaping
liability is a relatively rare and therefore meaningful event when y is small,
given that ph = 0, pl = 1 and q is large. Fault-based liability makes this
event more banal and therefore less meaningful.
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Welfare. In comparing liability regimes, we took for granted that the
socially appropriate behavior in the circumstance c was the level e(c) min-
imizing the sum of prevention costs and expected harm, as in the stan-
dard model without image concerns. Accordingly, the liability regimes were
ranked on the basis of the equilibrium compliance rates. We now derive this
approach from fundamentals.
Let us write the individualsutility as
u = wn   max(be  e; 0) + I ;  = 0; 1: (9)
For the non prosocial,  = 0 and the utility function is the same as before,
with wn as net wealth. For prosocial individuals,  = 1 and the middle term
is the disutility (e.g., guilt) su¤ered when the level of care is less than the
socially optimal be (the optimal level will depend on the circumstances c); 
is large so that a prosocial always chooses the social standard of behavior.
Welfare is the sum of utility over all individuals:
W =
Z c
0
[u1(c) + (1  )u0(c)] dG; (10)
where u(c) is type s expected utility in the circumstance c.
Individuals can both cause harm or su¤er harm caused by others. Con-
sider an omniscient regulator who can directly impose the action e(c), c 2
[0; c], on all individuals. The average net wealth is then
wn = w0  
Z c
0
[ce(c) + p(e(c))L] dG; (11)
where w0 denotes the individualsinitial wealth. Let be(c) be welfare maxi-
mizing and assume that the regulator can choose whether or not to publicize
information about the individualstypes. Suppose rst that an optimum en-
tails that no information is disclosed. Then be(c) maximizesW subject to the
resource constraint (11) and to beliefs satisfying I =  for all individuals.
Clearly, this implies be(c) = e(c) as dened in (1). Welfare then equals
W  = w0  
Z c
0
[ce(c) + p(e(c))L] dG+ :
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Now the same result would obtain with full or partial disclosure of informa-
tion about types because the reputational benets and losses simply cancel
out. Therefore e(c) is indeed the socially optimal level of care in the cir-
cumstance c.
When legal liability yields a second best with undercompliance, welfare
is easily seen to equal
W =W   
Z c
cr
[(pl   ph)L  c] dG
where cr solves G(cr) = yr and yr is the equilibrium compliance rate under
the legal regime r. Abstracting from administrative costs, the best liability
regime is therefore the one with the highest compliance rate.
4 Judicial Error
Fault-based liability is generally more e¢ cient than strict liability at trans-
forming the externality due to social image concerns into incentives to exert
socially appropriate care. We now inquire whether this remains so when
the greater informational requirements of such regimes can only be partially
satised, so that trial outcomes are noisy signals. We consider the case
where circumstances can be ascertained without error, hence there is no
uncertainty about the legal standard of behavior, but courts can make mis-
takes in assessing whether the defendant complied with due care. They can
erroneously rule against the defendant (a false positiveor type I error) or
erroneously rule in his favor (a false negativeor type II error).
The risk of judicial error about a defendants actions implies that the
negligence rule will have elements of strict liability. Moreover, a complete
description of the legal regime must now take into account how the judicial
system trades-o¤ type I and type II errors. Di¤erent trade-o¤s dene di¤er-
ent legal regimes. In practice, how a tribunal deals with the risk of error is
determined by the prevailing rules of proof, by which me mean the burden
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of proof assignment and the standard of proof. The party with the burden
of proof needs to persuade the court that he is entitled to a judgment in his
favor, otherwise the default decision is that he looses the case. The standard
of proof refers to the weight of evidence needed to discharge the burden.
Burden and standard of proof. Because harm occurs more often
under low care, its mere occurrence provides some information about an
individuals behavior.7 Any additional information that might be used to
assess behavior is summarized by the random variable x with cumulative
distribution functions Fh(x) and Fl(x) that depend on the defendants level
of care. The distributions have continuously di¤erentiable density functions,
denoted fh(x) and fl(x), and the same support [x; x]. The invariant sup-
portcondition means that no realization x perfectly reveals the defendants
care level.
Assumption 3: fl(x)=fh(x) is strictly decreasing with fl(x)=fh(x) = 0.
The distributions satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP)
with the convention that a small x is more indicative of low care. The
values of x should be interpreted as summarizing particular realizations of
the potential evidence, i.e., x0 < x00 means that the evidence underlying x0
is more unfavorable to the defendant than the evidence underlying x00. By
itself, x merely reects the ranking of potential realizations of the evidence.
The strength of the evidence is related to the ratio fl=fh. The condition
that fl=fh goes to zero means that values of x approaching the upper bound
of the support are tantamount to perfectly informative evidence.8
The plainti¤ (or public prosecutor) has the burden of proving the occur-
7 Indeed, when ph = 0 and pl > 0, the mere occurrence of harm provides perfect
information. In what follows, we assume ph > 0.
8The condition is not essential but it simplies the exposition by eliminating the possi-
bility of corner solutions in what follows. The invariant support condition is not essential
either. If the supports of fh and fl overlap only partly, the evidence will sometimes (but
not always) reveal care perfectly.
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rence of harm and the injurers identity. As before, this can either be done
without ambiguity (with probability q) or not at all. When this require-
ment is satised, a suit is feasible. Both the plainti¤ and the defendant are
then assumed to have access to the additional evidence x about the injurers
behavior, as well as to perfect evidence concerning the circumstances faced
by the defendant. The complete evidence eventually submitted to the court
therefore comprises the occurrence of harm and the injurers identity, the
circumstances and the realization x. When c > c the individual who has
caused harm would not be found negligent, so there is no point in suing.
When c  c there are two possibilities:
(i) If, as is usually the case, the plainti¤ has the burden of proving the
defendants negligence, he succeeds only if he can submit x such that
plfl(x)
phfh(x)
> k (12)
where k is the standard of proof that must be satised to discharge the
burden. The expression on the left-hand side is the likelihood ratio of low
care versus high care on the part of the defendant, given the evidence the
defendant caused harm and the additional evidence is x. The condition
(12) states that evidence must be adduced showing that inadequate care is
k times more likely than due care.
(ii) If the defendant bears the burden of proving that he complied with
due care, he avoids liability only if he can submit x such that
phfh(x)
plfl(x)
> k: (13)
The interpretation is similar except that the left-hand side is now the relative
likelihood of high versus low care. To escape liability, given that he is known
to have caused harm, the defendant must show that compliance with due
care is k times more likely than non compliance.
In the above formulation, court rulings are based purely on the evidence
pertaining to the particular case before the court. Rulings are independent
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of the views or priorsthe court may hold about the general prevalence of
high care among the population of individuals known to have caused harm
and with cost of care c. The contested issue is the particular defendants
action. Both in common law and in civil law, priors in the form of a known
(e.g., at equilibrium) proportion of similar defendants exerting high care or
low care in similar circumstances would not be considered as relevant or
admissible evidence.9
We consider standards of proof satisfying k  1. The case k = 1 is
the common law preponderance of evidence standard. For the party with
the burden of proof, it then su¢ ces to show that the relevant evidence
gives greater weight to his contention, however slightly; that is, the party
with the burden of proof need only prove his claim on a more likely than
not basis. A threshold k > 1 means a stronger standard. For instance,
it is sometimes said that k = 3 roughly conveys the standard of clear and
convincing evidence (see Schauer and Zeckhauser 1996).
For a given standard of proof, the assignment of the burden of proof
yields di¤erent evidentiary thresholds for the court to rule in favor of the
plainti¤ or the defendant. In Figure 6, bxP (k) is the evidentiary thresh-
old when the plainti¤ bears the burden of proof. The defendant is then
found negligent if x < bxP (k), which corresponds to condition (12). When
the defendant bears the burden of proving compliance with due care, the
requirement is dened by condition (13) and the evidentiary threshold isbxD(k). The defendant then escapes liability only if x > bxD(k). For the pre-
ponderance of evidence standard, the evidentiary threshold does not depend
9Or would amount to statistical discrimination. For a discussion, see Demougin and
Fluet (2005, 2006) and the references therein. Decisions based on (12) amount to comput-
ing the posterior probabilities of low versus high care on the basis of neutral normative
prior. See Posner (1999, p. 47): Ideally we want the trier of fact to work from prior
odds of 1 to 1 that the plainti¤ or prosecutor has a meritorious case. A substantial depar-
ture from this position, in either direction, marks the trier of fact as biased.See Kaplow
(2011) for a more general discussion.
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on the assignment of the burden of proof; it is denoted bxE in the gure.
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Fig. 6. Likelihood ratios
The liability risk di¤erential. Let bx be the evidentiary threshold for
some assignment of the burden and some standard of proof. Conditional on
the occurrence of harm and a suit being led, the probability of being found
liable is j  Fj(bx) depending on the care level j = h; l. When the defendant
complied with due care, the probability of a type I error is h; when he
exerted inadequate care, the probability of a type II error is 1  al. For any
evidentiary threshold, the monotone likelihood ratio property implies that
h < l except when the threshold is at the bounds of the support, in which
case the equality holds.
It is useful to express l as a function of the type I error h = Fh(bx),
i.e., l(h)  Fl
 
F 1h (h)

.
Lemma 3 l(h) is strictly concave with l(0) = 0, l(1) = 1 and
0l(h) =
fl(F
 1
h (h))
fh(F
 1
h (h))
, h 2 [0; 1]: (14)
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Ex ante, given the possibility of court error, the liability risk di¤erential
between low and high care is  = q(pll   phh). Written as a function of
the type I error, the liability risk di¤erential is (h) = q(pll(h)  phh)
and is therefore concave in h. Figure 7 provides an illustration. Observe
that the di¤erential is zero when h = 0 and that it is equivalent to the
one under strict liability when h = 1, except for the fact that injurers now
escape liability when c is above c.
10 Eha
ha
))(( hhhll ppq aaa -
)( hl ppq -
d
Fig. 7. Liability risk di¤erential
Lemma 4 Under Assumption 3, (h) has a strict interior maximum at
h = 
E
h  Fh(bxE) where bxE solves
plfl(bxE)
phfh(bxE) = 1:
The lemma states that, irrespective of the burden of proof assignment,
the liability risk di¤erential is maximized if courts decide the case on the
basis of the preponderance of evidence standard of proof. Assigning the
burden of proof to the plainti¤ (resp. the defendant) and using a standard
of proof stronger than preponderance would yield a type I error smaller
(resp. larger) than Eh .
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5 E¢ cient Rules of Proof in Fault-Based Regimes
We now consider how to design the rules of proof in order to maximize
incentives to comply with due care. In the present set-up this is equivalent
to maximizing welfare. From the preceding section, a liability regime can
be summarized by the type I error h in rulings of negligence.
Bad news and good news are dened as before. Replicating the approach
in Section 3, it is easily seen that a non prosocial individual with cost of
care c exerts high care if and only if
c  minfq(pll(h)  phh)[min(w;L) + ]; cg  cN (; h): (15)
The interpretation is the same as for the condition (5) of Section 3. The
critical cost below which an individual exerts high care is now written as
a function of the rules of proof.10 Accordingly, the compliance rate now
satises
y =  N (; h) 
G(cN (; h))
G(c)
: (16)
As before, the function is strictly increasing in the reputational penalty (as
long as y < 1).
Clearly, when the non prosocial have no social image concerns, i.e.,  = 0,
 N (; h) does not depend on the reputational penalty and therefore com-
pliance is maximized by maximizing the liability risk di¤erential, thus by
setting h = Eh .
11 When social image matters, however, there is an addi-
tional consideration because the legal regime will also a¤ect the reputational
penalty.
10When the evidence about the defendants precautions is perfectly informative, h = 0
and l = 1. The condition (15) then reduces to (5).
11Compliance is then smaller than under perfectly informative evidenve because
q[pll(
E
h ) phEh ] < qpl, where the right-hand side is the liability risk di¤erential without
judicial error. As is well known, judicial error reduces incentives (see Polinsky and Shavell
1989).
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Lemma 5 Under the negligence regime with type I error h, the reputa-
tional penalty satises  = 'N (y; h) where
'N (y; h) 
[1 G(c)qphh]
1 G(c)q[(+ (1  )y)phh + (1  )(1  y)pll(h)]
  phh
(+ (1  )y)phh + (1  )(1  y)pll(h) :
The function is decreasing in y with 'N (1; h) = 0.
For a given legal regime, an equilibrium is a solution to y =  N (; h)
and  = 'N (y; h). As before, the solution is unique. We denote the
equilibrium by (yN (h);N (h)).
Choosing the best liability regime requires maximizing yN (h) with re-
spect to its argument. Let us dene
(h; y)  G(c)q[(+ (1  )y)phh + (1  )(1  y)pll(h)]: (17)
The expression is the proportion of individuals found liable under the regime
h when the rate of compliance is y. At equilibrium under this regime, the
proportion of individuals found negligent is (h; yN (h)). We will say that
nding negligence is a rare event if the proportion of individuals found to
be at fault is less than one half; conversely, it is a frequent event if the
proportion is greater than one half. We can now state the following.
Proposition 2 Suppose the negligence regime maximizes compliance with
due care. Then the plainti¤ bears the burden of proving negligence (resp. the
defendant bears the burden of proving compliance with due care) if nding
negligence is a rare (resp. frequent) event. In either case the standard of
proof is stronger than preponderance of evidence.
The intuition is a simple one. Suppose h is compliance maximizing.
Consider a marginal increase in the type I error; that is, it now becomes
easier for the plainti¤ to prove the defendants negligence or it becomes
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more di¢ cult for the defendant to prove that he complied with due care.
Suppose this shifts the  N curve to the right in the neighborhood of the
equilibrium. Observe that this can arise only when h is below 
E
h , the
evidentiary threshold under the preponderance of evidence standard. In
other words, the compliance maximizing regime is then characterized by the
plainti¤ bearing the burden of proof and by a standard of proof stronger
than preponderance of evidence. Now, if the 'N curve also shifts upwards
in a neighborhood of the equilibrium, then compliance will increase and
therefore h cannot have been compliance maximizing. Thus, it must be
that the 'N curve shifts downwards, i.e., an e¢ cient regime trades-o¤ the
e¤ects on the liability risk di¤erential and on the reputational penalty. More
generally, at a compliance maximizing regime, a small change in the type
I error must have e¤ects of opposite signs on the  N and 'N curves. As
shown in the Appendix, whether the 'N curve shifts upwards or downwards
depends on the frequency of negligence rulings.
Corollary 2 When qG(c)(ph + (1  )pl)  1=2, maximizing compliance
requires the plainti¤ to bear the burden of proving the defendants negligence
and to do so to a standard greater than preponderance of evidence.
The corollary provides a straightforward su¢ cient condition. The ex-
pression in the corollary is an upper bound for the proportion of individuals
found to be at fault under any regime. Hence the condition in the Corollary
follows trivially from Proposition 2. As a particular case, the condition is
satised when pl  1=2. Thus, when the occurrence of harm seldom arises
even under low care, the plainti¤ should be assigned the burden of proof.
Su¢ cient conditions for the defendant to bear the burden of proof are
not as straightforward to characterize. We describe one possible case. Sup-
pose q = 1 so that undercompliance is solely due to the inability to pay fully
for the harm done. Suppose further that G(c) = 1, i.e., high care is the
due care standard in all circumstance. Let byN be the equilibrium compli-
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ance rate when the evidence is perfectly informative as in Section 3. The
corresponding proportion of individuals found negligent is
bN = (1  )(1  byN )pl:
There will be cases where bN > 1=2. Fault is then a frequent event because
most injurers are not prosocial, few of them are induced to comply with due
care even with perfect evidence (e.g., they have small wealth and do not
care too much about social image), and harm occurs often when inadequate
care is taken. A similar outcome can arise when the evidence is imperfectly
informative.
Table 1 presents two examples. In the rst pl is less than one half, hence
the burden of proof is on the plainti¤. The standard of proof di¤ers signi-
cantly from the preponderance of evidence standard, the more so the greater
the proportion of prosocial individuals in the population. In the second ex-
ample, the probability of causing harm under either level of care is larger
and pl is above one half. When the proportion of prosocial individuals is
small ( = :2), the defendant now bears the burden of proof. Indeed, he
must then satisfy a standard of proof close to clear and convincing evidence
in order to discharge the burden. When the proportion of prosocial individ-
uals is larger, fault again becomes a rare event and the burden of proof is
assigned to the plainti¤.
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Table 1
Example 1: ph = :0:1, pl = 0:4, 
E
h = :336, l(
E
h ) = :983
 Burden k h l(

h) y 
.2 Plainti¤ 1.47 .306 .974 .14 .24
.4 Plainti¤ 1.67 .297 .970 .19 .43
.6 Plainti¤ 2.22 .274 .959 .23 .55
.8 Plainti¤ 3.31 .241 .937 .24 .60
Example 2: ph = :0:4, pl = 0:8, 
E
h = :283, l(
E
h ) = :964
 Burden k h l(

h) y 
.2 Defendant 3.35 .375 .990 .34 .27
.4 Plainti¤ 1.37 .257 .949 .36 .44
.6 Plainti¤ 1.82 .233 .930 .39 .50
.8 Plainti¤ 2.47 .207 .902 .37 .47
Note: q = 1; w = :2,  = :8, G(c) = c for c 2 [0; 1], L is large enough
for c > 1, Fj(x) = 1  exp( jx) with h = 1 and l = 10.
6 Concluding Remarks
An adverse court judgment does not have the same social meaning in strict
liability and fault-based regimes. In either case, the meaning also di¤ers
depending on the proportion of virtuous individuals in the population and
the extent to which formal legal sanctions underdeter. When assessing a
defendants actions is subject to error, the meaning of a nding of fault also
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depends on the risk of type I and type II judicial errors and therefore on the
rules of proof.
In many situations, accidental harm or violations of the law will be rare
events and so will be legal suits. When the evidence is imperfect, a fault-
based regime that seeks to maximize incentives to comply with the legal
standard of behavior should then make it relatively di¢ cult to nd fault.
This is achieved by assigning to the plainti¤ (or prosecutor) the burden of
proving the defendants fault and imposing a standard of proof stronger
than preponderance of evidence. The intuition is that not nding fault is
then banal, i.e., posterior beliefs do not di¤er much from the prior. By con-
trast, a nding of fault yields substantial disesteem. Making it harder still
to nd fault increases the reputational sanction and therefore the incentives
to comply. On the other hand, when accidental harm and suits are frequent
events, not having been found liable may provide signicant prestige. The
reputational gain  hence the incentives to comply with due care  can
be increased by making it relatively di¢ cult to escape liability. The best
regime is then one that imposes on the defendant the burden of proving
that he complied with due care and to do so to a standard stronger than
preponderance of evidence. Obviously, this reasoning abstract from other
trade-o¤s such as litigation costs or di¤erences between plainti¤ and defen-
dant in their access to the evidence (see Bernardo et al. 2000, Hay and Spier
1997, Demougin and Fluet 2008, and Shin 1998).
Our results are reminiscent of Bénabou and Tiroles (2011) discussion of
how acceptable behavior arises from the interplay of honorand stigma.
High stigma is attached to a behavior that is just not done, i.e., only
the worst type will do it. Alternatively, when everyone does it, the same
behavior carries little stigma. But then not doing ityields prestige. In the
case of trial outcomes under the negligence rule, whether the nding of fault
imposes signicant stigma or whether not nding fault confers signicant
honor depends on the underlying situation, but to some extent can also be
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inuenced by the liability regime for the purpose of increasing incentives to
comply with the legal standard of behavior.
Our analysis focused on reputational concerns and the information con-
veyed by judicial outcomes under di¤erent liability regimes. A nding of
fault is a more precise signal about ones character than being found liable
under a strict liability regime. One could also remark that di¤erent regimes
have di¤erent expressive content. In our analysis, the underlying social
norm was that individuals should be socially minded and behave accord-
ingly. This norm is perfectly expressedby a fault-based regime, i.e., by
the duty or obligation with respect to which fault is dened. Strict liability
is fuzzier in this respect. In the accident model, it merely prescribes that in-
dividuals compensate victims for harm done. Strict liability and fault-based
regimes may also di¤er in other ways with respect to expressive content.
When individuals are imperfectly informed of the harm they may cause, the
legal standard of due care under a fault-based regime conveys information,
as in DAntoni and Galbiati (2007). The prescriptive content of fault may
then help the prosocial themselves to coordinate on the socially appropriate
behavior (see Cooter 1998). Imitative behavior due to reputational concerns
then induces some bunching by the non prosocial.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Let us write the good news-bad news events as Gr
and Br, depending on the liability regime r = S;N . Under strict liability,
the probability that a prosocial is found liable is
Pr (BS j  = 1) = G(c)phq + [1 G(c)]plq = pq:
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For a non prosocial, using (6), the probability is
Pr (BS j  = 0) = G(cS())phq + [1 G(cS())]plq
= yG(c)phq + (1  yG(c))plq
= pq + (1  y)G(c)(pl   ph)q
Hence,
Pr(BS) = Pr (BS j  = 1) + (1  ) Pr (BS j  = 0)
= pq + (1  )(1  y)G(c)(pl   ph)q:
Applying Bayesrule,

S
B = Pr ( = 1 j BS) =
Pr (BS j  = 1)
Pr(BS)
=
p
p + (1  )(1  y)G(c)(pl   ph)
and

S
G = Pr ( = 1 j GS) =
 (1  Pr (BS j  = 1))
1  Pr(BS)
=
(1  qp)
1  q[p + (1  )(1  y)G(c)(pl   ph)] :
Under the negligence rule, prosocial individuals are never found negligent
so that Pr (BN j  = 1) = 0. For the non prosocial the probability is
Pr (BN j  = 0) = [G(c) G(cN ())]plq
= (1  y)G(c)plq:
Hence
Pr(B) = Pr (B j  = 1) + (1  ) Pr (B j  = 0)
= (1  )(1  y)G(c)plq:
Applying Bayesrule, 
N
B = Pr ( = 1 j B) = 0 while

N
G = Pr ( = 1 j GS) =

1  (1  )(1  y)G(c)plq :
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The rest of the proof is left to the reader.
Proof of Lemma 2. Given the information provided by bad or good news
and taking y as given, the likelihood ratio of  = 1 relative to  = 0 is
lr(A) =
Pr (A j  = 1)
Pr (A j  = 0) ; A 2 fGr; Brg; r = S;N:
The probabilities on the right-hand side are derived in the proof of Lemma 1.
The binary signal under the liability regime r0 is more informative than the
signal under regime r if lr0(), considered as a random variable, is a mean-
preserving spread of lr(). Likelihood ratios have the same mean (equal to
unity), so the MPS condition is satised if lr0(Br0)  lr(Br) and lr0(Gr0) 
lr(Gr) with at least one strict inequality. Clearly, lN (BN )  lS(BS). For
y < 1, lN (GN )  lS(GS) is easily seen to be equivalent to condition (7).
That lN (GN )  lS(GS) implies NG (y)  SG(y) is left to the reader.
Proof of Proposition 1. Uniqueness of the equilibrium follows from y =
 r() and = 'r(y) being increasing and decreasing functions respectively,
r = S;N . Because  S(0) < 1 by Assumption 1 and 'S(1) = 0 by Lemma
1, the 'S(y) and  S() curves can intersect only at some yS < 1, implying
S > 0. For the negligence rule, 'N (y) and  N () can intersect either at
yN < 1 with N >  or at yN = 1 with N = .
(i) To see that yS < yN , suppose the contrary, i.e., yS =  S(S) 
 N (N ) = yN . Recalling (4) and (5), the inequality can hold only if S 
N . However, this yields a contradiction because (7) implies 'S(y) < 'N (y)
and both functions are decreasing, implying S = 'S(yS) < 'S(yN ) <
'N (yN ) = N .
(ii) See the example in the text.
(iii) It is easily veried that, for all y, 'S(y) ! 0 and 'N (y) !  as
! 1. By continuity, for  large, we therefore have 'S(y) <   'N (y) for
all y, implying yS < yN and S < N . For the negligence rule, yN = 1 and
N =  if  satises plq[min(w;L) + ]  c, while it is always the case
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that yS < 1 as shown above. By continuity, for  large, we will therefore
have yS < yN . An increase in  shifts the  S curve to the right with no
e¤ect on 'S . Therefore, for a su¢ ciently large , 'S(yS) <  implying
S < N .
Proof of Corollary 1. An increase in w or  shifts the  r curves to the
right with no e¤ect on the 'r curves. An increase in q shifts the  r curves
to the right and the 'r curves upwards, so that yr increases but the e¤ect
on r is ambiguous. A change in  a¤ects only the 'r curves. For the
negligence rule, an increase in  shifts the 'N curve upwards, hence both
yN and N increases. For the strict liability rule, the penalty function can
be expressed as
'S(y) =
(1  )(1  y)G(c)q(pl   ph)
(y)(1  (y))
where
(y)  p + (1  )(1  y)G(c)q(pl   ph):
It follows that
sign

@'S(y)
@

= sign

@
@

(1  )
(y)(1  (y))

:
Now
@
@

(1  )
(y)(1  (y))

=
(y)(1  (y))(1  2) + (1  )(1  2(y))(d(y)=d)
(y)2(1  (y))2 :
When  is close to zero, the second term in the numerator is negligible and
the rst term is positive. When  is close to unity, the second term in the
numerator is negligible but the rst term is negative.
Proof of Lemma 3. Equation (14) follows directly from the denition of
l(h). Di¤erentiating once more,
00l (h) =
d
dh
 
fl(F
 1
h (h))
fh(F
 1
h (h))
!
< 0;
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where the sign follows from the MLRP in Assumption 3.
Proof of Lemma 4. Using Lemma 3,
0(h) = qph

pl
0
l(h)
ph
  1

= qph

plfl(x)
phfh(x)
  1

where x = F 1h (h):
By Assumption 3, and noting that fl(x)=fh(x) > 1,
0(0) = qph

plfl(x)
phfh(x)
  1

> 0
and
0(1) = qph

plfl(x)
phfh(x)
  1

=   qph < 0:
The maximum of (h) is therefore interior, satisfying the rst-order con-
dition stated in the lemma. The maximum is strict because of the strict
concavity of (h).
Proof of Lemma 5. The argument is the same as in Lemma 1, but
noting that an individual exerting high care is now found liable with the
probability phqhG(c); an individual exerting low care is found liable with
the probability plqlG(c).
Proof of Proposition 2. A compliance maximizing regime solves
max
y;;h
y s.t. y   N (; h) and   'N (y; h).
The Lagrangian is
L = y +  [ N (; h)  y] +  ['N (y; h) ]
where  and  are non negative multipliers. The necessary conditions for
an interior maximum h 2 (0; 1) are
@L
@y
= 1  +  @'N (y; h)
@y
= 0; (18)
@L
@
= 
@ N (; h)
@
   = 0; (19)
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@L
@h
= 
@ N (; h)
@h
+ 
@'N (y; h)
@h
= 0 (20)
Noting that @ N=@ > 0, (18) and (19) imply that both multipliers are
strictly positive. It therefore follows from (20) that @ N=@h and @'N=@h
must be of opposite signs. From (15) and (16),
sign

@ N (; h)
@h

= sign
 
0(h)

:
The penalty function in Lemma 5 can be rewritten as
'N (y; h) =
G(c)(1  )(1  y)(h)
(h; y) (1  (h; y))
where (h; y) is dened as in (17). It is easily veried that
sign

@'N (y; h)
@h

= sign

0(h)  (h) (1  2(y; h))
(h; y) (1  (h; y))
@(y; h)
@h

where @=@h > 0. In the solution h, @ N=@h and @'N=@h are there-
fore of opposite signs only if
0(h) (1  2(yN (h); h))  0
or equivalently 0(h) T 0 if (yN (h); h) S 12 . Recalling Lemma 3, that
is, 0(h) T 0 if h S Eh , then completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 2. In the regime h, the proportion of individuals
found negligent is
(h; yN (h))
= G(c)q [(+ (1  )yN (h))phh + (1  )(1  yN (h))pll(h)]
Because h  l(h)  1, in any regime
(h; yN (h))  G(c)q [(phh + (1  )pll(h)]
 G(c)q [(ph + (1  )pl] :
Hence the condition in the corollary ensures that nding negligence is a rare
event in the compliance maximizing regime.
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